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FOR DS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/ITA, AF/E, AND CA/OCS/ACS/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/04
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [CASC](#) [MOPS](#) [PTER](#) [DJ](#) [SO](#)
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: EAC DISCUSSES AL-SHABAAB THREAT

REF: IIR 6 982 0185 10; 09 DJIBOUTI 1241; 10 DJIBOUTI 133

CLASSIFIED BY: David R. Williams, ARSO, U.S. Department of State,
U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(D), (G)

¶1. (S/NF) Core members of Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) met February 2 to discuss recent threat reporting regarding U.S. service members (ref A), review current security conditions, and determine whether there was a need to increase our security posture. GRPO stated that this reporting was consistent with recent streams of reporting on threats in the region, but could not further substantiate the claims made in ref tel A.

¶2. (C) EAC members agreed that in recent months there has been increased threat reporting with respect to Djibouti city. The EAC reviewed existing mission security procedures, which already reflect a high level of preparedness, and concluded that no new measures were warranted.

¶3. (SBU) EAC members concluded that existing language in the Consular Information sheet for Djibouti, the information contained in the RSO security in-brief, and the October 29, 2009, Warden Message remains sufficient, and that no additional warden notice is needed at this time.

¶4. (U) Post will continue to monitor security conditions closely and will reassess our posture as needed.
SWAN